The prevalent interpretation of Gödel's Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory T does not prove its consistency. In this paper, we will re-examine the justification of this philosophical interpretation. Detlefsen's Stability Problem challenges such a justification by requiring that every sentence (in the language of T ) expressing T -consistency has to be shown to be unprovable in T . We will argue that the usual attempts to meet this challenge do not provide a satisfactory solution, since they employ specific Gödel numberings, which can be seen as arbitrarily chosen "coordinate systems" in the process of arithmetisation. A satisfactory solution to the Stability Problem therefore has to be based on a more general version of Gödel's Second Theorem independent of such a coordinate system. We will propose such a solution by proving the invariance of Gödel's Second Theorem with regard to acceptable numberings.
Introduction
According to the prevalent philosophical interpretation of Gödel's Second Theorem, a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory T does not prove its consistency. Detlefsen's Stability Problem (Detlefsen, 1986) challenges the justification of this interpretation by requiring that every L-formula expressing T -consistency has to be shown to be unprovable in T .
1 Detlefsen (1986) states:
[one] must locate a set C of conditions on formulae of T (T now being treated also as the system in which the syntax of T is to be represented) such that (1) every formula of T that can reasonably be said to express the consistency of T satisfies the conditions in C, and (2) no formula of T that satisfies C can be proven in T provided that T is consistent. (p. 93)
The classical approach to meeting Detlefsen's challenge proceeds in three steps. Firstly, a set P T of conditions is isolated such that every L-formula that can reasonably be said to express T -provability satisfies P T . Secondly, "construction-principles" C are given, turning L-formulae into L-sentences, such that every L-sentence that can reasonably be said to express the consistency of T is constructed by a principle of C from a formula satisfying the conditions in P T (in short: satisfies C[P T ]). Finally, a generalised version of Gödel's Second Theorem is proven, showing that no L-formula satisfying C[P T ] is T -provable, provided that T is consistent.
In what follows, this classical approach is re-examined. Since the principles usually employed for P T and C are dependent on specific arbitrarily chosen Gödel numberings, they are, as we will argue, not sufficient to satisfy clause (1) of the Stability Problem. In section 2 we propose alternative formulations of both P T and C and observe that the classical version of Gödel's Second Theorem does not suffice to establish clause (2) of the Stability Problem. A more general "numbering sensitive" version of Gödel's Second Theorem is thus called for, establishing its invariance with regard to acceptable numberings. We discuss the notion of a numbering's acceptability in section 3, where we argue that computability is a necessary condition for the acceptability of a numbering. We then introduce a precise notion of computability, allowing the informal invariance claim to be restated as a (meta-)mathematical theorem, which is proved in section 4. Section 5 concludes with some final remarks.
The present work may be viewed as in line with other attempts to eliminate arbitrary choices in the process of arithmetisation. Visser (2011) locates three sources of indeterminacy in the formalisation of a consistency statement for a theory T : (I) the choice of a proof system; (II) the choice of a Gödel numbering; (III) the choice of a specific formula representing the axiom set of T .
According to Visser (2011) , "Feferman's solution (Feferman, 1960) to deal with the indeterminacy is to employ a fixed choice for (I) and (II) and to make (III) part of the individuation of the theory" (p. 544). Visser's (2011) own approach rests on fixed choices for (II) and (III) but is independent of (I). The primary result of the present work is to eliminate the dependency on (II).
Technical Preliminaries. In the context of Gödel's Second Theorem, we take any "sufficiently adequate" L-theory to extend the Tarski-MostowskiRobinson theory R.
2 Define x ≤ y ≡ ∃z z + x = y. The theory R is given by the following axiom schemata:
2 See (Tarski et al., 1953, p. 53) . This more general framework was suggested to us by Albert Visser. For further information about R the reader may also consult (Visser, 2014) .
Criteria of Expressibility
Classically, the meaning of an L-formula is taken to be its model-theoretic interpretation over the standard model N. For instance, the formula ∃y(2 · y = x) expresses the property of being an even natural number. However, through the process of arithmetisation a second layer of meaning can be assigned to L-formulae. By taking an extensional 3 stance on metamathematics, we neither assume that the provable equivalence of two L-sentences in some specific theory is necessary, nor sufficient for them to express the same syntactic statement. In order to make this second semantic layer precise, three criteria are typically used in the literature: Kreisel's condition, i.e., taking a formula φ(x) to express the property with extension {χ | T φ( χ )}, the meaning-postulate criterion and the resemblance criterion.
4 For an overview the reader is referred to (Halbach & Visser, 2014a) , whose terminology we also adopt.
Expressing Consistency
Often attempts to give an account of expressibility of consistency, in effect deal rather with expressibility of provability. The reason for this can be seen to lie in the inapplicability of Kreisel's condition, which does not range over closed L-sentences, and the unavailability of sensible meaning-postulates. This reduction of expressibility of consistency to expressibility of provability is typically (implicitly) justified by taking Pr(x) to express provability if and only if ¬Pr( 0 = S0 ) expresses consistency. That is to say, irrespective of which criteria are generally thought to explicate expressibility most adequately, this step is almost always (mostly implicitly) justified by some version of the resemblance criterion, which requires the structure of a formal consistency statement to resemble the structure of a corresponding consistency statement formulated in the metalanguage. To further clarify this, we consider various formulations of consistency statements in a metalanguage of L: a) the sentence '0 = S0' is not T -provable; b) for every L-sentence ψ: ψ ∧ ¬ψ is not T -provable; c) for every L-sentence ψ: ψ or ¬ψ is not T -provable.
We now turn to formal consistency (L-)sentences:
(i) ¬Pr T ( 0 = S0 );
(ii) ¬Pr T ( ψ ∧ ¬ψ ); (iii) ¬Pr T ( ψ ) ∨ ¬Pr T ( ¬ψ ); (iv) ∀x, y, z(Sent(x) ∧ Neg(x; y) ∧ Conj(x, y; z) → ¬Pr T (z)); (v) ∀x, y(Sent(x) ∧ Neg(x; y) → (¬Pr T (x) ∨ ¬Pr T (y))).
3 In the terminology of (Franks, 2009b) . 4 The fact that meaning-postulate criteria are formulated relative to a theory is compatible with our stance on metamathematics, since "even an extensionalist might adopt an intensional attitude when moving from the question 'is S consistent?' to the question 'does S prove that it is?'" (Franks, 2009b, p. 247 ).
(i)-(iii) can be seen to have the same schematic structure as a)-c), while (iv) and (v) are single sentences resembling the quantificational structure of b) and c) respectively.
When employing the resemblance criterion, the appropriate choice of C depends on the exact formulation of the metamathematical consistency statement of T . For instance, taking b) as the formulation of the consistency statement, we will take any formal sentence expressing T -consistency to be either of the form (ii) or (iv), depending on whether a schematic or quantificational version of the resemblance criterion is employed. The fact that this criterion is highly sensitive to the specific formulation of the respective property in the metalanguage, renders it problematic for providing necessary conditions of expressibility. In order to avoid unjustified restrictions, we take the construction-principles C to be any of the above versions (i)-(v), for any sentence ψ, with Pr T (x) being a predicate satisfying P T . This ensures clause (1) of the Stability Problem to be satisfied, since every L-formula that can reasonably be said to express T -consistency can be taken by our liberal approach as one of the forms (i)-(v), where Pr T (x) is a predicate expressing T -provability.
5 Yet, what criteria should be employed for the expressibility of being an L-sentence, and the syntactic operations of negation and conjunction, occurring in the formulations of (iv) and (v)? Here we resort to Kreisel's condition as a minimal requirement, only assuming that the formula Sent numerates (in T ) the set of (Gödel numbers of) L-sentences, the formula Neg numerates (in T ) the graph of the syntactic operation of negation, etc.
Expressing Provability
It is notoriously difficult to adequately explicate the expressibility relation of provability in a general setting and no commonly accepted standard exists in the literature. In this paper we follow the classical approach in viewing Löb's conditions as necessary for an L-formula to express T -provability. For instance, Huber-Dyson (1991) takes these conditions as "the axiomatic formulation of minimal requirements that a meaningful concept of theoremhood ought to satisfy" (p. 256). Most objections to Löb's conditions pertain only to their use as sufficient meaning postulates for theoremhood -if they are at all concerned with meaning. Hence these often legitimate objections do not have any bearing on this paper's purpose, since Detlefsen's Stability Problem is only concerned with their less controversial use as necessary conditions. In following this classical route, we however depart from Detlefsen (1986 Detlefsen ( , 2001 himself, who argues against Löb's conditions as necessary meaning postulates for expressibility.
6 We do not attempt to resolve the contentious status of Löb's conditions in this paper and leave a thorough discussion of this issue for another occasion (see also (Franks, 2009a) ). For a further philosophical assessment of Löb's conditions the reader is referred to (Visser, 2016) .
Thus according to the approach chosen in this paper, any L-formula Pr T (x) expressing T -provability is taken to satisfy Löb's conditions for T , i.e., for all L-sentences φ and ψ:
Together with C this yields the following solution to clause (1) of the Stability Problem: every L-sentence that can reasonably be said to express the consistency of T satisfies C[P T ], viz., is of one of the forms (i)-(v), for any sentence ψ, with Pr T (x) satisfying Löb's conditions for T , Sent numerating (in T ) the set of (Gödel numbers of) sentences, Neg numerating (in T ) the graph of the negation operation, etc.
We may observe that it is sufficient to consider only consistency statements of the form (i), when showing that every L-formula satisfying C[P T ] is not Tprovable:
Lemma 2.1. Let T ⊇ R, Pr T satisfy Löb1 and Löb2 (for T ) and Sent, Neg and Conj satisfy Kreisel's condition. Let ψ be any L-sentence. Then the formal sentences (i)-(iii) based on Pr T are T -provably equivalent. Furthermore, (iv) and (v) T -provably imply (ii) and (iii) respectively.
Thus the following classical version of Gödel's Second Theorem is sufficient to establish clause (2) of the Stability Problem, i.e., to show that every L-sentence satisfying C[P T ] is not T -provable.
Theorem 2.2 (Gödel's Second Theorem). Let T ⊇ R. For all L-formulae Pr T (x) satisfying Löb's conditions (for T ), T ¬Pr T ( 0 = S0 ).
"Numbering Sensitive" Criteria
We have outlined above the classical approach for solving Detlefsen's Stability Problem. However, the employed conditions C[P T ] are dependent on a specific Gödel numbering and this strategy is thus flawed. For there might exist an Lsentence Con * that can reasonably be said to express T -consistency yet only satisfies the conditions C[P T ] relative to a different Gödel numbering.
7 Moreover, Theorem 2.2 does not rule out the possibility of T Con * , since its scope only ranges over consistency statements satisfying C[P T ] relative to the specific, originally employed, numbering. This renders C[P T ] in its above version inadequate as a necessary condition of expressing consistency. Furthermore, Theorem 2.2 is insufficiently general to establish the T -unprovability of all sentences expressing T -consistency. Detlefsen's Stability Problem thus remains open, unsettling the justification of the philosophical interpretation of Gödel's Second Theorem.
This problem was already observed by Heck (2007) Here too the justification of the philosophical interpretation of this version of Tarksi's Theorem, viz., "the naïve theory of truth, given by the scheme 'S' is true iff S, is inconsistent with arithmetic" (Heck, 2007, p. 27) , is argued to rely on the invariance of the corresponding formal theorem, viz., T ( A ) ↔ A is inconsistent with PA S , with regard to numberings. For otherwise there might exist a different numbering α such that both {T ( A α ) ↔ A | A is an L ∪ {T}-sentence} is consistent with PA S and T (x) can reasonably be said to express naïve truth (for instance, in virtue of the Tarski biconditionals T ( A α ) ↔ A). The above quote in effect contains two invariance claims. The first one requires the proof to be independent of the employed numbering whereas the second claim only requires the theorem itself to be independent. Prima facie, the former claim is strictly stronger than the latter, since for instance the proof of the Diagonal Lemma is trivial when using a numbering with "implemented diagonalisation" (see, for instance, g of (Heck, 2007, p.22) or gn 1 of (Halbach & Visser, 2014b, Appendix) ), while a standard numbering seems to require a standard proof. Yet how may the latter invariance claim be made more precise? It seems to be intuitively convincing that the trivial proof using g and a standard proof of the Diagonal Lemma are different. But in more subtle cases clear criteria are needed as to when two given proofs qualify as equal or as employing the same methods and resources. Furthermore, there are typically various routes to prove a theorem. For instance, one can employ a non-standard numbering in a proof of a theorem formulated relative to a standard numbering, as is the case in our proof of the Diagonal Lemma 4.5 (taking α to be standard).
Since in this paper we are concerned with Detlefsen's Stability Problem, it suffices to focus on the weaker, and more comprehensible, invariance claim. The above analysis shows that what is needed are "numbering sensitive" versions of the conditions C[P T ] which do not depend on the employed Gödel numbering.
9
In order to accomplish this, we first make the numbering used in the employed criteria of expressibility explicit. Prima facie, any injective function α from a set of L-expressions to N qualifies as a numbering. A formula Pr α T (x) is then said to satisfy Löb's conditions relative to α for T , in short: satisfies P α T , if for all L-sentences φ and ψ:
9 A different approach to this problem worth pursuing consists in avoiding numberings from the beginning and to formulate Löb's conditions relative to an interpreted syntax theory, for instance building on Feferman (1994) or Grzegorczyk (2005) . This route has been recently taken up by Fedor Pakhomov.
10 Here φ α denotes α(φ), i.e., the standard numeral of the α-code of φ.
Similarly, the numbering is made explicit in the formalisation of consistency statements, yielding the following principles C α :
The classical conditions C[P T ] can therefore be seen to be C γ [P γ T ], for some specific standard Gödel numbering γ. In order to accommodate the possibility of there being two different numberings α and β, such that both ¬Pr 
if it is of one of the forms (i) α -(v) α , for any sentence ψ, with Pr α T (x) satisfying Löb's conditions relative to α (for T ), Sent α numerating (in T ) the set of α-codes of sentences, Neg α numerating (in T ) the α-codes of the graph of the negation operation, etc., for some numbering α.
It can easily be checked that the proof of Lemma 2.1 is independent of the employed numbering, thus once again it suffices to only consider consistency statements of the form (i) α , when showing clause (2) of the Stability Problem.
Deviant Numberings
The above approach however allows highly artificial and deviant numberings. For any given subset S of L-expressions an injective function α : Exp L → N can be defined such that the set of α-codes of S is binumerable. 11 For instance, set
This can simply be done by enumerating both S and Exp L \ S (without repetitions) and subsequently applying the number 2 · k to the k-th element of the enumeration of S and the number 2·k+1 to the k-th element of the enumeration of Exp L \ S. Clearly, these enumerations are possibly non-effective. Taking S = T then yields a numbering α such that the formula Pr α T (x) ≡ ∃y < x 2 · y = x satisfies Löb's conditions relative to α (for T ) and T ¬Pr α T ( 0 = S0 ), thus violating Gödel's Second Theorem. The reason for this can be found in the failure of the Diagonal Lemma with regard to α, i.e., there is no (α-)fixpoint of ¬Pr α T (x). To see this, assume that there exists G such that
Similarly, setting S = T h(N) yields a numbering β such that ∃y < x 2 · y = x binumerates {β(φ) | N |= φ}, thus violating (the semantic version of) Tarski's Theorem.
While α and β appear to be highly deviant numberings disallowing any arithmetisation of the usual syntactic properties, less artificial numberings can be constructed for certain theories T ⊇ R which still violate Gödel's Second Theorem and Tarski's Theorem respectively.
12 For instance, there exists a numbering δ ¬ (see Appendix 6) such that despite all functionsṠ,+,·,˙ ,=,∧,∀ being recursive relative to δ ¬ , 13 the set of T -theorems is binumerable by a ∆ 0 -formula Pr
Moreover there exists a numbering δ ∀ (see Appendix 6) such that despite all functionsṠ,+,·,˙ ,=,¬∧,→ being recursive relative to δ ∀ , the set {δ
In particular, the formula Tr
Both numberings δ ¬ and δ ∀ thus yield deviant results, even though they allow for the arithmetisation of a large portion of syntactic properties and operations. For instance, the num-function (mapping numbers to their standard numerals) and the substitution function for terms as well as for atomic formulae can be binumerated relative to both numberings. However, since¬ and∀ are not recursive relative to δ ¬ and δ ∀ respectively, the arithmetisation of the substitution function for (complex) formulae fails for both numberings. This can be seen as the reason why the Diagonal Lemma does not hold when employing these numberings, since its proof crucially relies on the arithmetisation of the substitution function.
It is important to note that these results do not serve as a refutation of classical metamathematical theorems but rather show that our initial naïve approach to numberings is not tenable. In all the above cases, sets of expressions which are intuitively not decidable are coded by decidable arithmetical sets relative to respective deviant numberings. This stands in contrast to the intuitive idea of numberings as mechanical procedures, translating properties of expressions into arithmetical formulae. In order to refine our naïve account, we restrict ourselves to acceptable numberings when defining numbering-sensitive criteria of expressibility, ruling out such deviant numberings. We thus rephrase the criterion
α , for any sentence ψ, with Pr T (x) satisfying Löb's conditions relative to α (for T ), Sent α numerating (in T ) the set of α-codes of sentences, Neg α numerating (in T ) the α-codes of the graph of the negation operation, etc., for some acceptable numbering α.
12 This point was raised by Albert Visser, who also suggested the initial idea underlying the constructions of δ ¬ and δ ∀ .
13 For instance, the function∀ is defined via (δ ¬ (x), δ ¬ (φ)) → δ ¬ (∀xφ), for expressions x, φ. The function˙ is defined via (δ ¬ (s)) → δ ¬ (s ' '), for expressions s. Note that in this framework variables are generated by subsequently concatenating primes ' ' to a primitive alphabetical symbol v. See also Example 3.3. We call a function γ : A → N recursive, if A is decidable and there exists a partial recursive function γ : N → N with dom(γ ) = A and γ A = γ. We call a function f :
is recursive (with α i being a numbering of the set S i , i ∈ {1, 2}).
The aim of the next section is to provide a formally precise yet conceptually clear account of the acceptability of numberings.
Acceptability of Numberings
It is notoriously difficult to make the informal notion of the acceptability of a numbering precise. However, for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to isolate a necessary condition of acceptability. Such a condition needs to be both conceptually convincing and formally precise. We start by reviewing three proposals found in the literature. We then argue that they do not satisfy our needs of generality or preciseness and conclude by proposing a satisfactory condition for our purposes.
According to Smith (2007) "the key feature of our Gödelian scheme [here we denote his introduced numbering γ] is this: there is a pair of algorithms, one of which takes us from an [L-]expression to its code number, the other of which takes us back again from the code number to the original expression" (p. 126). Given any other comparable coding scheme α, converting the α-code of a certain [L-]expression φ into its γ-code involves running through two algorithms (first mapping α(φ) to φ and then mapping φ to γ(φ)), which by assumption do not involve any open-ended searches (Smith, 2007, p. 126) . Conversely, γ-codes can be converted into α-codes in a similar fashion. Thus "there is a p.r. function tr which 'translates' code numbers according to [α] into code numbers under our official Gödelian scheme [γ] , and another p.r. function tr −1 which converts code numbers under our scheme back into code numbers under scheme [α]" (p. 126).
14 Let us call any numbering α for which such a pair of p.r. translation functions exist, computably translatable to γ. The following criterion of acceptability is then due to Smith (2007) :
Computable Translatability A numbering is acceptable iff it is computably translatable to the standard numbering γ.
While we agree with Smith's initial analysis that the key feature of acceptability consists essentially in intuitive computability, the proposed criterion fails to capture this feature in a conceptually adequate way. This failure can be seen to result from general difficulties in giving a precise account of computability of functions whose domain and co-domain are disjoint, such as numberings. To circumvent these difficulties, Smith instead requires acceptable numberings to be computably translatable to some designated standard numbering γ. The conceptual adequacy of the resulting criterion thus crucially rests on the intuitive computability of γ. For instance, employing one of the deviant numberings of 2.4 as a reference numbering instead of γ, would clearly render the criterion inadequate. What justifies the choice of γ as the reference numbering is exactly its intuitive computability. Hence, instead of taking the conceptually prior feature of computability as characterising acceptability, a conceptual surrogate is 14 The restriction to p.r. functions for tr and tr −1 is justified by construing the aforementioned algorithms without open-ended "do while" loops (see (Odifreddi, 1989, Proposition I.5.8) ). However, we believe that there is no clear reason to impose this restriction on the algorithms, thus allowing tr and tr −1 to be recursive functions. This does however not bear on the subsequent discussion.
employed.
15 Furthermore, Smith's justification for the existence of p.r. translation functions between numberings which share the same "key feature" (i.e., come with a pair of encoding and decoding algorithms) crucially relies on informal reasoning about computability. A more satisfactory approach would be to first formally characterise the conceptually prior notion of intuitive computability of numberings and then mathematically prove the existence of respective translation functions between them (cf. Theorem 3.12 and Corollary 3.14 below), employing the Church-Turing-Thesis only in its "interpretive use" (Smith, 2007, p. 275 ).
An account of acceptability 16 which is more directly linked to a characterisation of intuitive computability is introduced in (Manin, 2009 ) (and was already suggested in (Montague, 1957, chapter IV) ). There expressions are taken to be finite sequences over a finite alphabet. A numbering α is called sequenceadmissible, if the image of α is decidable and the length function, the projection function given by i, a 1 , . . . , a n → a i and the concatenation function are recursive.
17 Taking sequence-admissibility as a characterisation of intuitive computability (for a discussion of this claim see 3.2 below) yields the following criterion:
Sequence-Admissibility A numbering is acceptable iff it is sequence-admissible.
This criterion improves upon computable translatability by providing a more conceptually clear characterisation of the essential key feature of acceptability, i.e., of intuitive computability. It has however another disadvantage, namely its dependency on a specific representation of syntax. There are a variety of other equally suitable representations of syntax, yet there are no convincing arguments (known to the author) singling out a preferred or most adequate representation. However, when employing an adequate representation different to finite sequences, the above criterion is no longer applicable. Since this paper's aim is to formulate a criterion expressing T -consistency which is as "coordinate free" as possible, causing C ∀ * [P ∀ * T ] to depend on the representation of syntax would be rather undesirable.
A third approach can be found in (Smullyan, 1961) , who bases the concept of acceptability 18 of numberings on representability in elementary formal systems (for definitions see (Smullyan, 1961, p. 6) ). These systems can be seen as devices intended to "explicate the notion of 'definability by recursion'" (Smullyan, 1961, p. 2) directly operating on strings, without the usual recourse to numberings. A set E of strings which is definable by recursion in some elementary formal system is called formally representable. If in addition to E also the complement of E is formally representable, E is called solvable. The acceptable numberings of E are then taken to be exactly those which preserve these recursion theoretic properties. More precisely, an injective function α : E → N is called EFS-admissible, if for every subset S ⊆ E the following holds: S is formally representable iff α(S) is r.e. and S is solvable iff α(S) is decidable. This yields:
EFS-Admissibility A numbering is acceptable iff it is EFS-admissible.
Once again this definition has a computational motivation, since the concept of formal representability is intended to capture the concept of computability, in the sense that formally representable sets characterise sets which are generated by a "computing machine" (Smullyan, 1961, p. 9) . The above criterion can therefore be seen as a constraint to preserve the computational content.
As in the case of sequence-admissibility, this criterion once again depends on a specific representation of syntax. Furthermore we will show that weaker assumptions suffice to capture the intuitive computability of a numbering.
In short, a satisfying criterion of acceptability has to account for two things: (i) to allow for a more general approach with regard to the representation of expressions (i.e., not presupposing expressions to be finite sequences, as in the last two criteria) and (ii) to provide a conceptually adequate notion of computability (as opposed to the computable translatability criterion). The next two subsections are devoted to the proposal of a criterion satisfying both (i) and (ii).
Specifications and Universes of Expressions
The aim of this subsection is to provide a formal definition of a universe of expressions, which is general enough to accommodate a variety of different approaches to syntax representation.
Syntax is classically represented linearly, following Tarski (1936) . That is, expressions are represented as finite strings, which can be constructed by the operation of concatenation from a finite alphabet. For instance, the conjunction of the formulae φ and ψ can be represented as '(' φ ' ∧ ' ψ ')'. The usual mathematical idealisation of this representation is the finite sequence '(' * φ * ' ∧ ' * ψ * ')' , where * is a corresponding concatenation operation on finite sequences. The above representation employs an infix notation. Using prefix notation however yields the different representation ' ∧ (' φ ψ ')', postfix notation yields yet another, etc. Furthermore it can be argued that this conjunction is more adequately represented by the finite tree ' ∧ ' φ ψ which exhibits the inductive structure of the resulting expression more clearly and which is not dependent on arbitrary notational choices as in the linear case. Alternatively, expressions are represented as nested pairs (also called Sexpressions) in (Feferman, 1994) or as hereditarily finite sets in (Fitting, 2007) . Moving further towards an abstract syntax approach, Béziau (1999) construes a universe of expressions as an absolutely free algebra (see also (Halbach & Visser, 2014b, p. 711) ).
19 An in-depth discussion of the arbitrary choices involved in the treatment of syntax can be found in (Visser, 2016) .
The specific representation of syntax is classically taken to have no bearing on the treatment of Gödel's Second Theorem, with few exceptions such as Visser (2016) , who accurately observes that "no mathematical treatment of G2 correctly reflects our intuitive insight that is independent of the long sequence of design choices usually associated with the formulation of G2" (p. 81).
20 What is more, a sensible notion of computability of numberings, as in the case of the criterion of sequence-admissibility, explicitly resorts to the structure of expressions which in turn crucially depends on the choice of representation. Since the aim of this paper is to eliminate such arbitrary choices in the formulation of C
we introduce a framework which accommodates a general class of representations, including all those mentioned above, allowing for a uniform treatment of computability. The only restriction consists in assuming expressions to be generated from a finite "protoalphabet", following Quine (1940) .
In what follows, we take expressions to be specified by both a signature and an axiomatic theory formulated in equational logic. Each respective signature consists of specified function symbols which may be thought of as constructors, generating "raw expressions" from the alphabet, which is a designated subset of the signature containing constant symbols (also called generators). Thus, in mathematical terms, the signature induces a term algebra. The equational theory, which serves as the other constituent of a specification, provides constraints, specifying which raw expressions of the term algebra are to be identified. For instance, endowing the term algebra with a semi-group structure yields a representation of expressions as finite sequences (up to isomorphism). In order to meet our requirement of generality, expressions are taken to be specified independently of any choice of concrete implementations. Consequently, a specification of expressions gives rise to various representations of expressions which can be thought of as different ways of implementing a given specification. We will see that equational logic and initial algebra semantics, developed by Goguen et al. (1977) , provide a suitable framework to make this precise. Since this framework is perhaps not widely known, we will take some time introducing it.
Let Ω be an algebraic signature, i.e., a finite set of function symbols with given finite arities. Furthermore, let Ω n denote the subset of Ω which contains all function symbols of arity n. Each Ω is partitioned into a set Ω + of constructors and a set Ω 0 of generators, which only contains function symbols of arity 0. The set Ω 0 is also called an alphabet.
Definition 3.1. Let X be a set and let Ω be an algebraic signature. The set T Ω (X) of terms of signature Ω over X is the smallest set such that
We can naturally transform the set T Ω (X) into an Ω-algebra, called the term algebra T Ω (X) over X. When the context is determining Ω, we sometimes also write T (X) and T(X) respectively.
A short overview of equational logic is given below as its syntax is used for specifications, while its semantics provide concrete representations of specifications. Proofs and further material can be found in the classic (Burris & Sankappanavar, 1981) .
Semantics. Let Ω be a signature and X a set of variables such that Ω∩X = ∅. An Ω-equation over X is an expression of the form s ≈ t, with s, t ∈ T Ω (X). An Ω-algebra A is said to satisfy an equation s ≈ t over X, in symbols A |= Ω s ≈ t, if α(s) = α(t) for every homomorphism α : T Ω (X) → A. The variables in an equation are therefore implicitly taken to be universally quantified. For a set of Ω-equations E we write A |= Ω E, if A |= Ω e for every e ∈ E. We then also call A a model of E. For a class C of Ω-algebras we write C |= Ω s ≈ t, if s ≈ t is satisfied by each member of C. In particular, M od(Ω, E) denotes the class of all Ω-algebras satisfying a set of equations E.
Sytnax. The formulae of equational logic consist of all Ω-equations over a set X of variables. From a set E of Ω-equations, new Ω-equations can be deduced via the inference rules s ≈ s ,
and
T Ω (X) and homomorphisms α on T Ω (X) (i.e., substitutions). We write E Ω e, if e is an Ω-equation derived by the above rules with equations in E as axioms. It was first shown by Birkhoff (1935) that equational logic is sound and complete, i.e., for every Ω-equation e, M od(Ω, E) |= Ω e iff E Ω e.
Thus far, expressions are specified by a signature and an axiomatic equational theory. However, when considering numberings, we need domains to assign natural numbers to. Thus a transition from a given specification (Ω, E) to structures with domains is called for, without changing the information carried by (Ω, E). Consequently, certain models of the theory E are singled out as intended. To do so, firstly, we confine ourselves to models of E which do not satisfy more equalities than provable from E. Secondly, we stipulate that an intended model does not contain more elements than necessary, i.e., elements which do not denote closed Ω-terms. Definition 3.2. An Ω-algebra A is called an intended model of (Ω, E), if 1. A |= Ω e iff E Ω e for every Ω-equation e; 2. all elements of A denote closed terms of Ω. Equivalently, the (unique) Ω-homomorphism T Ω → A is surjective.
Let (Ω, E) be a specification. We call any intended model E of (Ω, E) a universe of expressions. If E contains all L-terms and L-formulae, we call E a universe of arithmetical expressions.
This definition provides a very general notion, accommodating most representations used in the literature:
* be the set of all finite sequences of elements of the alphabet A = Ω 0 (without the empty sequence) and let * be the concatenation operator on A * , turning (A * , * ) into an Ω + -semi-group. Let furthermore E = { ( (x, y), z) ≈ (x, (y, z))}. Then (A * , * ) is a universe of arithmetical expressions, since (A * , * ) ∼ = T Ω + (A)/ ∼ E . Note that in this framework the n-th variable is represented by the sequence starting with 'v', followed by n subscripts ' '.
II) Finite Sequences with Empty Sequence. Let A be as above and let Ω + = {' ', ' '}, where ' ' is a constant symbol. Let now A * be the set of all finite sequences of elements of A including the empty sequence 1, turning (A
/ ∼ E and therefore (A * , * , 1) is a universe of arithmetical expressions.
The set of finite trees with elements of Ω 0 as leaves and elements of Ω + as other vertices (with respective arity) is Ω-isomorphic to T Ω and is thus a universe of arithmetical expressions. U(y, z) ), U(x, x) ≈ x} be the equational theory of a bounded joinsemilattice. Let HF denote the structure of hereditarily finite sets with U HF (x, y) = x ∪ y, S HF (x) = {x}, ∅ HF = ∅ and s HF = {s} for each s ∈ Ω 0 (the elements of Ω 0 are taken as Urelements). Then HF is a universe of arithmetical expression of (Ω, E), since
T Ω is the structure of S-expressions with Ω 0 as a set of Urelements and a universe of arithmetical expressions. Originally, these expressions were invented for the programming language LISP. However, this approach can also be found in (Feferman, 1994) .
In order to show that the above representations are indeed universes of expressions, we have used an important characterisation of the intended models of a given specification (Ω, E):
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Lemma 3.4. Let E be an Ω-algebra and ν : Ω 0 → E, s → s E . Assume that no element of Ω 0 occurs in equations of E. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. E is initial in M od(Ω, E);
2. E Ω + has the (ν-)generalised universal property for M od(Ω + , E) over Ω 0 ;
22 It may be desirable to distinguish a sort for terms from a sort for formulae. A survey of a many-sorted initial algebra approach can be found in (Goguen et al., 1977, section 2) .
23 See, for instance, Burris & Sankappanavar (1981) .
3. E is an intended model of the specification (Ω, E).
Definition 3.5. Let C be a class of Ω-algebras and let A ∈ C. Let ν : X → A be such that A is generated by ν(X). If for every B ∈ C and for every function α : X → B there is a unique homomorphism α * : A → B such that α * • ν = α, then we say that A has the (ν-)generalised universal property for C over X. If X ⊆ A and ν is the inclusion function we also say that A has the universal property for C over X. If A has the universal property for C over ∅ we call A initial in C.
Define now a relation ∼ E on T Ω (X) by setting s ∼ E t iff E Ω s ≈ t. It is easy to see that s ∼ E t is a congruence on T Ω (X) and the resulting Ω-algebra T Ω (X)/ ∼ E satisfies E. An important property of this algebra is that it has the (ν-)generalised universal property for M od(Ω, E) over X, where ν :
. Furthermore, algebras with the universal properties over sets with the same cardinality are unique up to isomorphism. It thus follows from Lemma 3.4 that an Ω-algebra E is an intended model of (Ω,
Computable Simulations of Expressions
Based on this general account of representations we introduce now a precise notion of computable simulation of universes of expressions E. We then try to argue that the computable simulation of E are precisely the intuitively computable numberings of E, given the intuitive computability of E. Thus, as we argue, the introduced criterion both satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) (see page 11), which were required for a satisfactory account of acceptability. Let E be a fixed universe of arithmetical expressions, with specification (Ω, E). Let α : E → N be any injective function and set G = α(E). We define σ G :
. Each σ G can be seen as simulating the corresponding operation on E and is also called the tracking function of σ E under α. Then G together with the tracking functions σ G is an Ω + -algebra G of Gödel numbers. Furthermore, α : E → G is an Ω + -isomorphism and G is Ω + -generated over {α(s E ) | s ∈ Ω 0 }. Hence, to each constructor operation σ E on E there corresponds a tracking constructor operation σ G on G such that the set of Gödel numbers G is generated from these constructors over the set of α-codes of generators of E. Thus G can be seen as a simulation of E via α.
Until now no constraints were imposed on the given numbering α. That α computably simulates E can now be expressed as the constraint that the tracking constructor operations σ G mechanically generate the simulating set of Gödel numbers. Since these constructors operate on natural numbers, their computability can be explicated via the Church-Turing-Thesis. Additionally, we require that there exists a mechanical procedure checking whether or not a given input is the α-code of an expression. This yields the following definition:
24 Definition 3.6. Let E be a universe of expressions. We call a numbering α : E → N a computable simulation of E (or computably simulating E), if
We can now give a precise formulation of our proposed criterion:
Computable Simulativity Every acceptable numbering of a universe of expressions is a computable simulation thereof.
We now turn to the question of its conceptual adequacy. Since this involves speaking more carefully about computability, it is useful to have a general notion of a computational model at hand. The following definitions are taken from (Boker & Dershowitz, 2008) , with slight modifications.
25
Definition 3.7. A computational model C over domain E C is any object associated with a set of functions f : E C → E C . This set of functions is called the extensionality of the computational model (also denoted by C, slightly abusing the notation).
In order to state a version of the Church-Turing-Thesis for computational models over a wide class of domains, a relation of comparing the power of such models is introduced.
26 The basic idea is, that a model D is at least as powerful as a model C, if all functions of C can be bijectively 27 represented in D:
Definition 3.8. Let C and D be computational models over E C and E D respectively. We call D (computationally) at least as powerful as C, denoted C D, if there is a bijective function ρ :
Let REC denote the set of the general recursive functions and let TM denote the set of total functions which are Turing-computable. By a classical result, REC and TM are computationally equivalent (see, for instance, (Jones, 1997, chapter 8) ).
Based on the relation , a precise version of the Church-Turing-Thesis over arbitrary domains can be stated (see (Boker & Dershowitz, 2008, p. 208 
)):
Church-Turing-Thesis C TM, for every intuitively computable model C.
As is shown in (Boker & Dershowitz, 2008) , the adequacy of the ChurchTuring-Thesis in the above version relies on a certain robustness with regard to representations of the reference model. Definition 3.9. A model is complete if it is not of equivalent power to any of its strict supermodels. That is, C is complete if C ⊆ D C implies C = D, for all models D.
Not every computational model is complete, however REC and TM are, see (Boker & Dershowitz, 2006 , section 4).
However, we still lack a precise account of intuitive computability of functions with different domains. Here, we characterise the intuitive computability of such functions by preservation of computability. More precisely, let C and D be equivalent computational models over E C and E D respectively. We take a function α : E C → E D to be intuitively computable (based on the intuitive computability of C and D) iff the following condition is satisfied:
The direction from left to right of (C) C,D is motivated by the intuition that since D is at least as powerful as C, computability ought to be preserved by α, i.e., every C-computable function is mapped to a D-computable function. The other direction ensures that, since C being at least as powerful as D, only C-computable functions are mapped to D-computable functions.
Let now E be a universe of expressions. If E is intuitively computable, its constructors are intuitively computable, thus there is a computational model C over E which is intuitively computable such that σ E ∈ C for all σ ∈ Ω + . We furthermore assume that C is at least as powerful as TM. By the classical version of the Church-Turing-Thesis, REC provides an intuitively adequate computational model over N. The following theorem, which is a slight generalisation of Theorem 2 in (Boker & Dershowitz, 2008) , shows that in this case the intuitively computable numberings of E with decidable image are exactly the computable simulations of E, assuming the intuitive adequacy of C. Theorem 3.10. Let E be a universe of expressions and let C be a computational model over E which is intuitively computable, with σ E ∈ C for all σ ∈ Ω + . Then every numbering α : E → N with decidable image satisfies condition (C) C,REC iff it is a computable simulation of E.
Proof. Let α : E → N be a computable simulation. Since by assumption TM C, the Church-Turing-Thesis yields the equivalence of C and TM. Since also TM and REC are equivalent and is a preorder, the equivalence of C and REC obtains. Since in addition REC is complete, there exists a bijection ρ : E → N such that {ρ • f • ρ −1 | f ∈ C} = REC (this can be shown along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.2 in (Boker & Dershowitz, 2006) ). In particular, ρ • σ E • ρ −1 ∈ REC for all σ ∈ Ω + , hence also ρ is a computable simulation of E. Thus α • ρ −1 , ρ • α −1 ∈ REC by Theorem 3.12. We show now that (C) C,REC holds. If f ∈ C, then there exists g ∈ REC such that
and REC is closed under composition, g ∈ REC obtains. Let now f : E → E be such that its tracking function h under α is recursive.
Let now α be a numbering with decidable image which is not a computable simulation. Then there is a constructor σ E ∈ C of E such that its tracking function is not recursive, violating condition (C) C,REC .
Equivalence of Numberings
In this subsection we introduce an equivalence relation on numberings. We then use the fact that all acceptable numberings are equivalent to show that computable simulativity is extensionally equivalent to the criteria of computable translatability, sequence-admissibility and EFS-admissibility. It can be easily checked that ∼ is an equivalence relation.
Theorem 3.12 (Mal'cev (1961)). Let E be a universe of expressions and let α and β be computable simulations of E. Then α ∼ β.
Proof. Let (Ω, E) be a specification such that E ∼ = T Ω / ∼ E . Since T Ω is minimal, also the factor algebra T Ω / ∼ E is. Thus also E is minimal and in particular finitely generated. The proof then proceeds as in (Stoltenberg-Hansen & Tucker, 1995) .
A subset R ⊆ S is called decidable, recursively enumerable, arithmetical relative to a numbering α, if the set α(R) has the respective property. The following lemma shows that these properties are invariant with regard to acceptable numberings.
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Lemma 3.13. Let S i be sets and let α i and β i be numberings of S i such that α i ∼ β i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and k ∈ N. Then for any subset R ⊆ S 1 × . . . × S k the set α 1 × . . . × α k (R) is decidable, recursively enumerable, arithmetical iff β 1 × . . . × β k (R) has the respective property.
From Theorem 3.12 and Lemma 3.13 we obtain the extensional equivalence of computable simulativity and computable translatability: Corollary 3.14. A numbering α of a universe of expressions is a computable simulation iff it is computably translatable to the standard numbering γ.
Moreover, computable simulativity is extensionally equivalent both to sequenceadmissibility and EFS-admissibility, if expressions are represented as finite sequences:
Corollary 3.15. Let E be as in Example 3.3.I and let α be a numbering of E. The following are equivalent:
1. α is a computable simulation of E; 2. α is is sequence-admissible; 3. α is is EFS-admissible;
Proof. (2 ⇒ 1) and (3 ⇒ 1) are immediate.
(1 ⇒ 2): Let γ be a standard numbering which is a computable simulation as well as sequence-admissible. Then the length function and the concatenation function is recursive relative to γ, id and id ×γ, γ respectively (see footnote 17 on page 10). For any computable simulation α of E, these functions are also recursive relative to α, id and id ×α, α respectively, since α ∼ γ (Theorem 3.12) and r.e. sets are invariant with regard to equivalent numberings by Lemma 3.13.
(1 ⇒ 3): Use Theorem 3.12 and Lemma 3.13.
Computable simulativity therefore provides a conceptually adequate criterion which is strong enough to extensionally coincide with the three criteria introduced above. However, as opposed to Smith (2007) , Manin (2009) and Smullyan (1961) we impose computable simulativity only as a necessary condition for acceptability. 
Other Routes to Acceptability
We conclude this section with a discussion of criteria which are motivated by semantic considerations rather than computational ones. Since numberings play a crucial role in endowing arithmetical expressions with a second layer of meaning, in addition to their standard interpretation over N, it is reasonable to base the acceptability of numberings on some principle of compositionality. Accordingly, the meaning of every complex expression can be taken to be determined by its structure and the meanings of its subexpressions.
30 To make this more precise, we call s ∈ E an immediate subexpression of t ∈ E, if there exists σ ∈ Ω k such that t = σ E (t 1 . . . , t k ) and s = t i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We then take the subexpression relation to be the non-reflexive transitive closure of the immediate subexpression relation. The compositionality of α, i.e., the claim that every complex expression of E is determined by its structure and the (α-)meanings of its subexpressions can then be understood as α : E → G being an Ω + -homomorphism. 31 But as we have already seen above, every numbering α induces such a homomorphism. Hence every numbering is compositional in this sense.
Taking compositionality as a constituent for the acceptability of numberings, it can be shown that even the "mode of presentation" does not yield any proper restriction on numberings. Let α : E → N be any numbering and set G = α(E). Let ν : Ω 0 → E be the map s → s E . As we have seen above, α : E → G is an Ω + -isomorphism, hence G ∈ M od(Ω + , E). The numbering α can then be reconstructed in the following standard "bottom-up" fashion: firstly, map each element s of the alphabet Ω 0 to the number α • ν(s). Secondly, assign 29 Smith's (2007) treatment does not require sufficient conditions and he imposes acceptability only as a necessary condition for being "intuitively 'sensible'" (p. 126).
30 The following discussion does not depend on the specific conception of meaning of expressions. One might even endorse a similar principle of compositionality which resorts merely to the reference of expressions.
31 As in 3.2, G is the Ω + -algebra of Gödel numbers with domain G = α(E).
to each constructor σ ∈ Ω + k the partial function σ G : N k → N. These two steps then uniquely determine our initially given numbering, since by the ν-generalised universal property of E Ω + , α is the unique function which extents the assignment given in step 1 and is compositional with regard to the partial functions given in step 2, i.e., is an Ω + -homomorphism. Thus every numbering irrespective of its presentation can be reconstructed in the above fashion, which is the prevalent mode of presentation for standard Gödel numbers found in the literature.
Furthermore, it is ubiquitous in the literature to employ monotone constructors σ G in step 2. This gives rise to the following property of Gödel numberings: Definition 3.16. A numbering α of E is called monotone, if for every s, t ∈ E α(s) < α(t) iff s is a subexpression of t.
Monotonicity is a prevalent property shared by all standard numberings found in the literature (which are known to the author), yet seems justified more by technical convenience than conceptual analysis. For instance, requiring monotonicity ensures that the above bottom-up mode of presentation yields an injective function and therefore a numbering. Monotonicity thus serves as a technical constraint warranting the intended output of a particular construction principle. More importantly, to require monotonicity ensures a low arithmetical complexity of formulae representing syntactic properties, providing a crucial advantage in proving metamathematical theorems.
But are there any conceptual reasons justifying this property as a criterion for acceptability of numberings, which are not merely based on technical considerations? To begin with, the subexpression relation can be taken as an important structural relation of a universe of expressions E. Moreover, it can be argued that an acceptable numbering should preserve the structure of E. On these grounds, the induced algebra of Gödel numbers can be required to simulate the subexpression relation appropriately. Technically, this amounts to extending the signature Ω by a relation symbol '≺' and construing E as an Ω ∪ {'≺'}-algebra, where ≺ E is the subexpression-relation on E. A numbering α of E may then be called structure preserving if α : E → G can be turned into an Ω ∪ {'≺'}-isomorphism. It can be easily seen that in a similar way as in 3.2, for every α a "tracking relation" ≺ G on G can be defined, such that G is an Ω ∪ {'≺'}-algebra and α is an Ω ∪ {'≺'}-isomorphism. Thus, once again, structure preservation in this sense does not impose any proper restriction on numberings.
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In requiring monotonicity, one has to additionally refer to the arithmetical content of ≺ G , namely to require ≺ G to be the arithmetical order relation <. Yet how to conceptually justify this? It seems that by demanding monotonicity, one no longer conceives of numberings as mere means to translate expressions into numbers in a structure preserving way, but moreover, one requires properties of expressions to be "resembled" in the arithmetical content of G. In a similar vein, one may require that 0 G = 0 (i.e., the Gödel number of the constant symbol '0' is 0).
It remains unsettled how this form of "content resemblance" can be based on conceptually adequate grounds. In our view, such a requirement seems to confuse the two layers of meaning assigned to expressions. While one layer endows arithmetical expressions with their standard arithmetical interpretation, the other allows the simulation of syntax in arithmetic. Since syntax is taken here to be conceptually different from natural numbers, there are no convincing reasons why the meaning, qua syntax simulation, of an expression (i.e., its Gödel number) should depend on the standard interpretation of that expression. We therefore treat these two semantic layers independently and construe numberings merely as syntactic translational devices, blind of the arithmetical content of the translated expressions. Consequently in what follows, acceptable numberings are not required to be monotone. This also permits a more general approach, since monotonicity constitutes a proper constraint on computable simulations. For an example of a non-monotone computable simulation see (Halbach & Visser, 2014b, Appendix) .
Invariance of Gödel's Second Theorem
We start this section by proving the invariance of the semantic version of Tarski's Theorem, which is a slight generalisation of the result in (Manin, 2009, p. 240 
):
33 Theorem 4.1. For all acceptable numberings α of a universe of arithmetical expressions, the set {α(φ) | N |= φ} is not arithmetical.
Proof. Let α be any acceptable numbering of a universe of arithmetical expressions and let γ be a standard numbering such that Tarski's Theorem holds with regard to γ, i.e., {γ(φ) | N |= φ} is not arithmetical. By Lemma 3.13 also {α(φ) | N |= φ} is not arithmetical.
In order to establish the invariance of Gödel's Second Theorem, we formalise certain properties of the equivalence of numberings in R.
Definition 4.2. Let γ : A → N be a function with A ⊆ N and let f (x, y) ∈ F ml L be a binumeration of (the graph of) γ. We call f (x, y) an inj-binumeration of Proof. Let γ : A → N be an injective recursive function and let γ be a total recursive function extending γ. By Theorem II.6 of (Tarski et al., 1953) there is a binumeration g(x, y) of γ . Let α(x) be a binumeration of A. Then
In order to show that f (x, y) numerates γ, let n, m ∈ N be such that γ(n) = m. Since f (x, y) binumerates γ, we have R f (n, m) and R ¬f (k, m) for all k < n. Thus R f (k, m) → n = k for all k < n, which yields R f (k, m) → n = k for all k ≤ n. Using R4 yields ( * ) R ∀z ≤ n(f (z, m) → n = z). Thus R f (n, m). Since R ¬f (n, m) → ¬f (n, m) and R is consistent, f (x, y) also binumerates γ.
Let m ∈ γ(A). Let n ∈ N be such that ( * * ) R f (n, m). In order to show that f (x, y) is an inj-binumeration it suffices to show that R ∀x f (x, m) → x = n, which we prove in the following derivation in R: (7) and f.o.logic
Lemma 4.4. Let A ⊆ N and γ : A → N be an injective recursive function. Let f (x, y) be an inj-binumeration of γ and let φ(x) ∈ F ml L . Then there exists
obtains. The proof of the other direction is immediate.
In addition to proving the invariance of Gödel's Second Theorem, the above method can also be used to simplify proofs of metamathematical theorems. For instance, they provide a proof of the Diagonal Lemma which avoids the usual tedious process of arithmetisation (in particular of the numeral and the substitution functions).
Lemma 4.5. Let T ⊇ R and let α be an acceptable numbering and φ(x) ∈ F ml 1 L . Then there exists a sentence γ such that T φ( γ α ) ↔ γ. 34 We say that
Proof. Let gn 1 be the numbering introduced in (Halbach & Visser, 2014b, Appendix) . It can be easily checked that gn 1 is a computable simulation. Thus α ∼ gn 1 by Theorem 3.12. By Lemma 4.4 there exists a formula ψ(y) such that for all n ∈ N and m ∈ (gn 1 •α −1 )(N) we have ( * ) R f (n, m) → (φ(n) ↔ ψ(m)), where f binumerates gn 1 • α −1 . By definition of gn 1 , for any given formula ψ(y) there exists k ∈ N such that gn 1 (ψ(k)) = k (see Lemma 12.3 in (Halbach & Visser, 2014b) ). Hence ψ(k) gn 1 ≡ k and therefore ψ( ψ(k) gn 1 ) ↔ ψ(k).
Note that neither the definition of gn 1 nor the proofs of Theorem 3.12 and Lemma 4.4 employ any arithmetisation of the usual syntactic properties and operations.
Corollary 4.6 (Syntactic version of Tarski's Theorem). Let T ⊇ R and let α be an acceptable numbering. Then there exists no formula τ (x) ∈ F ml
Lemma 4.7. Let α and β be equivalent numberings of E and let T ⊇ R. Then there exists a binumeration f (x, y) of β • α −1 such that for each Pr α (x) ∈ F ml L satisfying Löb's conditions relative to α (for T ) there exists Pr
Proof. By Lemma 4.3 & 4.4 there exists a binumeration f (x, y) of β • α −1 and a formula Pr
, for all n ∈ N and m ∈ β(E). We show now that Pr β (x) satisfies Löb's conditions relative to β for T : (1) and (2).
Application of Löb1
We now apply Löb2 β and get T Pr
Combined with (3), T Pr
If Pr α (x) is a Σ We can now show the desired result. Proof. Let γ be a fixed standard numbering which is a computable simulation. By Theorem 3.12 we have α ∼ γ. Applying Lemma 4.7 yields a binumeration f (x, y) of γ • α −1 and a formula Pr γ T (x) satisfying Löb's conditions relative to γ (for T ), such that R ¬Pr
The reader might reasonably object that the formulation of Theorem 4.8 already presupposes the employed provability predicates to satisfy Löb's conditions. Since these conditions are specifically isolated to enable the schematic "modal reasoning" sufficient to prove Gödel's Second Theorem (or more generally, Löb's Theorem), what then does the above theorem really tell us about the invariance of Gödel's Second Theorem with regard to numberings? It should be noted that Löb's conditions alone do not suffice to prove Gödel's Second Theorem. What is additionally needed is the Diagonal Lemma. This theorem however is again sensitive to the employed numbering (see 2.4) and thus, even the assumption of Löb's conditions does not save us from complications caused by varying numberings.
Based on this observation, a different route can be chosen to prove the above theorem: the generalised version of the Diagonal Lemma (see 4.5) yields a fixed point for ¬Pr T (x). Then Gödel's Second Theorem can be proven by the usual "modal reasoning", without recourse to any properties other than Löb's conditions. Yet, no information about the existence of provability predicates satisfying Löb's conditions with regard to varying numberings is provided by Theorem 4.8. As a result, the reader might wonder how much C a formula Pr α T (x) satisfying Löb's conditions relative to α (for T ), numerating α(T ).
Despite its satisfaction of Löb's conditions as well as its numeration of Ttheorems, we believe that the provability predicate Pr (Halbach & Visser, 2014a, p. 676) ). In the case that meaning postulates (see (Halbach & Visser, 2014a, p. 676) ) are employed as sufficient conditions for the expressibility of provability, it should be noted that computable equivalence is too weak to preserve proof-theoretic properties which are not merely schematic.
To illustrate this point, let β 0 be an acceptable numbering of E. Let h : N → N be a strictly increasing, recursive but not T -provably total function. Define
Clearly β is injective and β ∼ β 0 . Furthermore, the function β(φ) → β(φ → 0 = 0) is not T -provably total. Hence there does not exists a numeration imp(x, y, z) of the graph of the function (β(φ), β(ψ)) → β(φ → ψ) such that T ∀xy∃z imp(x, y, z). The definition of β can be easily extended such that the tracking functions under β of all the constructors ¬, ∧, →, etc. are not Tprovably total. But this might reasonably be taken as a minimal requirement for an intensionally correct arithmetisation when resorting to the meaning postulate approach.
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Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to re-examine the justification of the prevalent philosophical interpretation of Gödel's Second Theorem. Following Detlefsen (1986) , such a justification consists of two steps: (1) Formulating necessary conditions for expressing T -consistency and (2) proving that all L-sentences satisfying these conditions are not derivable in T . We have argued that the classical route employing Löb's conditions and the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb-theorem (2.2) is incomplete. This is due to the dependence of the conditions on specific, arbitrarily chosen, Gödel numberings, disqualifying them as necessary meaning postulates for expressing provability. In order to provide a satisfactory solution to (1), a numbering sensitive generalisation of Löb's conditions has been introduced, devoid of the aforementioned deficiencies. That is, instead of assuming every formula expressing provability to satisfy Löb's conditions relative to one specific numbering, only satisfaction of Löb's conditions relative to some acceptable numbering is required. Once more, providing a necessary condition of the acceptability of a numbering, namely its computability, is sufficient for a solution of (1). In order to obtain a notion of computability independent of the specific representation of syntax, the framework used accommodates a wide class of design choices. Finally, this provides us with a philosophically adequate as well as formally precise solution for (1) (see C ∀ * [P ∀ * T ] on page 7). Since (2) exceeds the scope of the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb-theorem (2.2) as a result of weakening the conditions in (1), we have proven a generalised version of Gödel's Theorem (4.8), establishing its invariance with regard to acceptable numberings. As a result, (1) and (2) fix the gap detected in the classical route and provide us with a more solid justification of the philosophical interpretations of Gödel's Second Theorem.
The need to re-examine and strengthen the justification of respective philosophical interpretations is however not restricted to Gödel's Second Theorem. In general, when formulating metamathematical results, one commonly resorts to certain arbitrary design choices, such as the representation of syntax, the Gödel numbering, the proof system, the choice of specific formulae representing certain syntactic properties, etc. However, these notions often do not occur in the formulation of the result's philosophical interpretation. The justification of this interpretation hence crucially depends on the invariance of the result with regard to the notions absent in its interpretation's formulation. Such invariance is usually assumed but rarely mathematically proven, thus rendering the justification of the respective metamathematical result insufficiently founded. In addition to contributing to the justification of the classical philosophical reading of Gödel's Second Theorem, the invariance of the following theorems with regard to acceptable numberings has been established: the Diagonal Lemma (4.5), both the semantic (4.1) and the syntactic (4.6) version of Tarski's Theorem as well as Löb's Theorem and its formalised counterpart (see footnote 35).
It should be noted that the notion of acceptability used in this paper is too weak to ensure the invariance of metamathematical theorems which do not only resort to schematic quantification. For instance, when employing a uniform version of Löb's conditions (see for instance (Visser, 2016, p. 71) ), Lemma 4.7 appears to be outside the scope of this paper's methods. While Lemma 4.4 can be converted into a uniform version such that R + "≤ is a linear ordering" ∀xy f (x, y) → (φ(x) ↔ ψ(y)), the translation function binumerated by f is not necessarily T -provably total. This is however a necessary ingredient for proving the invariance regarding numberings along the lines of our proof of Lemma 4.7. The same applies to the parametric version of the Diagonal Lemma (see (Hájek & Pudlák, 1998 , Theorem III.2.1)), the free-variable version of Löb's Theorem (see (Smorynski, 1977 , Theorem 4.1.7)), etc. These remarks suggest that invariance results of such theorems require a more restrictive notion of acceptability, allowing further properties of the resulting translation functions to be verified within T . A philosophically adequate account of acceptability of numberings relative to a theory is thus called for.
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The above observation is closely related to another direction of research into which the study of invariance may be extended. For instance, in addition to Gödel's Second Theorem itself being invariant, one might reasonably also require its proof and the process of arithmetisation to be independent of the employed numbering. This would rule out intensionally incorrect provability predicates such as those present in the proof of Theorem 4.8, as well as nonstandard proofs based on deviant numberings (see Lemma 4.5). As noted in the discussion following Theorem 4.9, a stronger invariance claim such as this is likely to require translation functions of numberings to preserve not only necessary but sufficient, and thus more restrictive, conditions for expressing provability or other syntactic properties. Once again, a more refined notion of acceptability of numberings is needed. We believe that future work in this direction may further elucidate to what extent the choice of numberings bears on intensionality phenomena in metamathematics.
6 Appendix: Constructions of Deviant Numberings
We take here L-expressions to be represented as finite trees, i.e., the universe of expressions E is generated by the constructors Ω
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We first specify a numbering δ ¬ of E such that the tracking functions of all constructors of Ω + other than ¬ E are recursive and the set of (δ ¬ -codes of) T-theorems is decidable, for any fixed consistent theory T ⊇ R proving the commutative semiring axioms (see e.g. Ax1-Ax7 in (Kaye, 1991, p. 16f.) ). For technical convenience, we employ a derivability relation such that for every formula φ we have T φ iff T ∀φ, where ∀φ denotes the universal closure of φ.
The basic idea is to construct δ ¬ such that all (δ ¬ -codes of) T -theorems can be isolated from the remaining (δ ¬ -codes of) expressions of E by the decidable property of parity. In order to do so, we first partition the even and odd numbers into infinite decidable sets, each corresponding to a certain syntactic category. Let x, y ≡ (x+y+1)(x+y+2) 2 + y be the usual pairing function. We define the following functions:
In what follows, we define δ ¬ such that all (δ ¬ -codes of) terms are elements of 
41 For technical convenience we add the constant symbol '1' to L.
In allowing the rewriting of a term by means of rewriting any AC-equivalent term, R is thus extended to the class-rewriting system R/AC. In order to show that this system terminates, let A = {n ≥ 2 | n ∈ N} and consider the following polynomial weight functions:
All polynomials (a)-(e) satisfy associativity and commutativity. Furthermore the polynomials F l,r (i.e., the result of subtracting the weight of the right hand side from the left hand side of a given rule) of the rules (i)-(v) are X − 1, 1, X, 2X − 2 and 3 respectively, which are all strictly positive (over A). Thus R/AC is terminating (see (Terese, 2003, Chapter 6) ).
Furthermore, R is left-linear. The critical pairs of R are of the form (u + v, 1 · u + 1 · v), (0, 0 · u + 0 · v) and (t · u, t · u + t · 0). It can easily be checked that they converge, for instance,
Hence the class-rewriting system R/AC has the Church-Rosser property modulo AC (see (Dershowitz & Jouannaud, 1990 , Chapter 7)).
We may conclude that for each term, R/AC effectively computes a unique normal form up to permutations under associativity and commutativity. In order to decide whether or not T s = t for two terms s, t, one proceeds as follows: first effectively rewrite s and t into their respective normal forms s and t . Then check whether or not s ∼ AC t . Since the word problem for AC is decidable and T s = t iff s ∼ AC t , the decidability of T s = t obtains. This decision process can be resembled on the δ ¬ 0 -codes of terms in the usual way, yielding a corresponding decidable arithmetical property P rEqu(m, n).
In order to extend δ ¬ 0 to a numbering of E satisfying the desired properties,
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we exploit the fact that for any given expressions φ, ψ and x, whether or not φ ∧ ψ and ∀xφ are T -provable is already fully determined by the T -provability of φ and ψ (and by the decidable fact of whether or not x is a variable). Clearly this does not hold for ¬, as neither T ¬φ nor T ¬φ are entailed by T φ. For this reason, ¬ E will not have a recursive tracking function under δ ¬ . Let {χ n | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of T -provable formulae which are of the form ¬φ and let {ν n | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of expressions of the form ¬φ which are not T -provable (including not well-formed expressions). Set δ
We now successively extend the numbering δ
in ω-many steps to a numbering of E, by defining a function δ ¬ i+1 for each i < ω as follows:
, s is not a variable or T ψ. Clearly, Pr(x) defines {δ ¬ (φ) | T φ}. As we have seen above, PrEqu(x, y) can be taken to be a ∆ 0 -formula, as well as Seq(x), Term(x) and Var(x). It remains to show that the variable s can be bounded. To do so, construct a ∆ 0 -definable height function h(x) such that h(δ ¬ (φ)) = #{ψ | ψ is a subformula of φ}. Then the length of the sequence (coded by) s can be bounded by the number of subformulae of the theorem (coded by) x, i.e., by h(x). Thus Pr(x) can be taken to be ∆ 0 .
We conclude by showing the tracking functions of all operations of Ω + other than ¬ E to be recursive relative to δ ¬ . As above, it can be shown that dom(δ ¬ i ), for all i < ω as well as dom(δ ¬ ) is decidable. Moreover, s is a variable and T φ are decidable (relative to δ ¬ ). To then compute, for instance, the tracking function∧ : dom(δ ¬ ) → N of ∧ E , one first decides for a given input (m, n) whether or not Pr(m) and Pr(n). If both hold, then the output is Λ ∧ (m, n). If not, the output is Θ ∧ (m, n). Hence, the tracking function∧ is recursive. Showing the recursiveness of the remaining tracking functions proceeds in a similar way.
We now construct a numbering δ * of E such that the tracking function of ¬ E is recursive and the set of (δ * -codes of) T-theorems is decidable, for any fixed consistent theory T ⊇ R. As opposed to the above construction, we here employ the standard derivability relation such that only closed sentences are Ttheorems. We then use the fact that membership of ¬φ in the sets {φ | T φ}, {φ | T ¬φ} and {φ | T φ, T ¬φ} is already fully determined by the respective membership of φ. This does however not hold for φ ∧ ψ, since for instance T ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) but T ¬(φ ∧ φ), for any T -independent φ. Hence, in what follows, δ * (φ ∧ ψ) is not defined along the lines of δ * (¬φ) and thus ∧ E does not have a recursive tracking function under δ * . Let {χ n | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of T -theorems which are not of the form ¬φ, let {µ n | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of T -refutable sentences which are not of the form ¬φ and let {ν n | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of L-expressions not of the form ¬φ which are neither T -provable nor T -refutable (including non-well-formed expressions).
First, we set δ * 0 (χ n ) = 3· 0, n , δ * 0 (µ n ) = 3· 0, n +1 and δ * 0 (ν n ) = 3· 0, n +2, with dom(δ * 0 ) = E \ {¬φ | φ ∈ E}. Then we extend δ * 0 to a numbering of E in ω-many steps by defining δ * i+1 for each i < ω:
if T ¬φ, T φ and δ * i (φ) = 3 · i, j + 1 3 · i + 1, j + 1, if T φ and δ * i (φ) = 3 · i, j 3 · i + 1, j + 2, if T φ, T ¬φ and δ * i (φ) = 3 · i, j + 2 Finally, we set δ * = i<ω δ * i , with dom(δ * ) = i<ω dom(δ * i ). It is easy to check that δ * is indeed a numbering of E. We now show that the ∆ 0 -formula Pr(x) ≡ ∃y < x x = 3 · y defines {δ * (φ) | T φ}. First, we define the height function if h ¬ (φ) is odd. Since there is a 1 : 1-correspondence between T -theorems φ and pairs of natural numbers h ¬ (φ), n , the set of δ * -codes of T -theorems is exactly 3N.
To show that the tracking function of ¬ E under δ * is recursive proceeds as in the case of δ ¬ .
We conclude by specifying a numbering δ ∀ of E such that the tracking functions of all constructors of Ω + other than ∀ E are recursive and {δ ∀ (φ) | N |= φ} is decidable. As in the case of δ ¬ , we partition the natural numbers into decidable infinite sets corresponding to certain syntactic categories: all (δ ∀ -codes of) true sentences are elements of 3N = {3 · n | n ∈ N}. Similarly, all (δ ∀ -codes of) false sentences are elements of 3N + 1, and all (δ ∀ -codes of) expressions which are not sentences are elements of 3N + 2. Thus the formula Pr(x) ≡ ∃y < x x = 3 · y satisfies Löb's conditions relative to δ ∀ (for T ) and
T ¬Pr( 0 = S0 δ ∀ ), for any sound T . Moreover, the set {δ ∀ (φ) | N |= φ} is definable by a ∆ 0 -formula.
In a similar way to the above definitions of δ ¬ and δ * , we define δ ∀ by exploiting the fact that the membership of ¬φ and φ ∧ ψ in {φ | N |= φ}, {φ | N |= φ and φ is a sentence} and {φ | φ is not a sentence} is already fully determined by the respective memberships of φ and ψ. This however does not hold for ∀ E , since there are expressions φ, ψ such that both N |= ∀xφ and N |= ∀xψ but φ ∈ {φ | N |= φ} and ψ ∈ {φ | φ is not a sentence}. Hence, in what follows, δ ∀ (∀xφ) is not defined along the lines of δ ∀ (¬φ) and δ ∀ (φ ∧ ψ), resulting in the non-recursiveness of the tracking function of ∀ E relative to δ ∀ . Let {χ n | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of true sentences which are of the form ∀xφ, let {ν n | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of false sentences which are of the form ∀xφ, and let {µ n | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of expressions of the form ∀xφ which are not sentences (with x and φ being L-expressions).
We first define δ 
